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Three-Year-Olds'  Difficulty  with  False  Belief : Conceptual
Deficit  or  Procedural  Artifact?
Yoshinobu TAKAHASHI
Department of Liberal Arts and Sciences, School of Health Sciences, Sapporo Medical University
Abstract
Many investigators in cognitive development assume that 3-year-olds either lack the notion of
belief entirely, or fail to realize that beliefs can misrepresent the world. This study reexamines the
main technique used to show basic inability in 3-year-olds to make judgments about a person's
thoughts when that person's knowledge happens to be false. Children were shown the real,
unexpected contents of a candy box and required to answer what a friend (or their mother) would
think was in it and what their own previous expectations had been. Children were divided into two
groups. One group answered verbally like previous studies, the other answered by selecting one
from five choices. Answers in this task were compared between the 2 groups. It was found, in
contrast to previous findings, that most 3-year-olds who answered by selecting attributed false
beliefs to others. This result did not support the previous explanation of 3-year-olds' failure in the
false belief task. This result suggested that 3-year-olds' difficulty with false belief resulted from a
procedural bias of previous studies.
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